



# AVOIDING PRAETORIAN SOCIETIES: FOCUSING U.S. STRATEGY ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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## **PKSOI PAPER**

### **AVOIDING PRAETORIAN SOCIETIES: FOCUSING U.S. STRATEGY ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT**

**Bruce Ferrell**

**March 2014**

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## FOREWORD

The impact of fragile states upon global peace and stability has perhaps never been more apparent than during the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. The initial limited campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq became the largest American stability and reconstruction campaigns since World War II, and led directly to the resurgence of counterinsurgency (COIN), stability and reconstruction operations as key facets of American strategy, impacting every dimension of the military's DOTMLPF. With American withdrawal from Iraq, the ongoing ramp down in Afghanistan, and the constrained fiscal environment, many strategic leaders and policy makers believe that the United States should curtail its involvement in such activities. The Defense Strategic Guidance of January, 2012 reflects this by stating, "U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations." However, threats and challenges associated with fragile states and ungoverned spaces remain. In *Avoiding Praetorian Societies*, LTC Bruce Ferrell proposes a new lens for viewing the challenges of fragile states and offers innovative adjustments to U.S. doctrine, strategic approaches and operational/tactical methods that can be feasibly executed in the contemporary constrained strategic environment.



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## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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## SUMMARY

It is clear that fragile nation-states will continue to be a major contributor to instability in the international strategic environment. The United States, its allies and partners have attempted to mitigate the negative effects of fragile states through a variety of approaches, including military stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations such as those undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan. America's success rate at conducting S&R operations, however, is mixed. Despite immense efforts undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan, the creation of politically stable states in both countries eludes the U.S., partner states, and international allies.

Despite frustrations, considering the prominence of fragile states in the strategic environment and U.S. strategic goals, it is inevitable that the U.S., and ultimately the U.S. military, will be involved in S&R operations in the future. Therefore, American performance must be improved. This paper argues that weaknesses in U.S. S&R operations are intellectual in nature. *The U.S. military, and to some extent the broader U.S. government, doesn't enunciate in official doctrine the centrality and causes of political instability in fragile states, and consequently S&R operations are planned and executed devoid of political development efforts.*

Current U.S. policy does not directly address the importance of political development in fragile states. In fact, while political stability is often emphasized, it is treated as a by-product of economic development, social development, and governance capacity to include security force assistance. This is a major policy oversight. Governance is not the same thing as politics. Indeed the definition of governance in JP 1-02 is too broad to be useful. Governance is the process by

which societies collectively solve problems and meet citizens needs (Osborne & Gaebler). Governance, therefore, is the leadership process of a society, both through formal and informal channels. Politics is the process by which power and influence is organized within a society or more specifically the government of a nation-state. There is a general failure to delineate between governance, political development, public administration and policy formulation.

While omitting the centrality of political development, further harm is done because current U.S. military doctrine and strategy actually *encourages* political instability. It does this in three ways. First, U.S. military whole-of-government approaches overemphasize economic and social development over political development. This paper provides ample evidence that despite the benefits of rapid economic and social development in fragile states, these forces also contribute to political instability. Second, U.S. military S&R efforts place too much emphasis on output institutions—those institutions that provide public goods and services—over input institutions—those legitimate organizations in society that facilitate citizen “input” into the political system. This unbalances the political system and causes instability. Finally, U.S. policy and military doctrine places too much emphasis on rapid democratization, which can be a cause of political instability when not implemented correctly.

The recurring theme of these policy and doctrine shortcomings is the lack of emphasis on political input institutions. Political input institutions perform six critical functions for a society’s political system: 1) organize political participation; 2) link social forces to the government; 3) interest aggregation and articu-

lation; 4) constructively compete with other political institutions and the government to further interests; 5) recruit new members and mobilize voters; and 6) hold public leaders and institutions accountable to citizens. The simple performance of these functions, however, is not enough to foster stability. These functions must be institutionalized—organized into recurring patterns of behavior that sustain these functions despite individual leadership. In short, political stability requires *strong* input institutions, with four primary characteristics: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. Political stability is achieved by balancing institutionalization with participation as illustrated by Huntington’s Political Stability Model discussed in this paper.

The author groups recommendations at the doctrinal level, strategic level, and operational/tactical level. Doctrinal recommendations include acknowledging the independence and centrality of political development, emphasizing political development in concert with economic, social, and public administration development, as well as moderating the current emphasis on rapidly holding elections. Strategic recommendations include making separate lines of effort for political development, public administration and policy formulation instead of merging all three into the imprecise moniker of governance. Another recommendation is to assess input institutions independent of output institutions since the desired characteristics of either type are not the same. Finally, at the operational and tactical level, the author highlights that many activities that units already perform can be leveraged to foster input institutions, such as building associative mechanisms and orchestrating governance by network. Most of these recommendations are mod-

est and require few, if any, additional resources. By fostering political development through the creation of strong input institutions, the U.S. can avoid creating praetorian societies and help foster civic societies.

## SYNOPSIS

Fragile states and their impacts upon global security and stability remain important challenges in the strategic environment. Therefore, American stability and reconstruction activities are crucial tools to U.S. National Security Strategy. America's success rate at conducting stability and reconstruction operations is mixed. Despite immense efforts undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a decade of doctrine and strategy development, the creation of politically stable states eludes the U.S., partner nations, and international allies. America must improve this track record. This paper argues that weaknesses in U.S. stability and reconstruction operations are intellectual in nature. The U.S military, and to some extent the broader U.S. government, doesn't enunciate in official doctrine the centrality and causes of political instability in fragile states, and consequently stability and reconstruction operations are planned and executed devoid of political development efforts. United States military doctrine and strategy must acknowledge the centrality of political development, understand the critical role of input institutions in political stability, and make efforts to foster these institutions in stability and reconstruction operations.



## AVOIDING PRAETORIAN SOCIETIES: FOCUSING U.S. STRATEGY ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The primary problem of politics is the lag in development of political institutions behind social and economic change...The problem is not to hold elections but to create organizations.

Samuel Huntington  
*Political Order in Changing Societies*

It is clear that fragile nation-states will continue to be a major contributor to instability in the international strategic environment.<sup>1,2</sup> Fragile states can serve as safe havens for terrorist organizations or international criminal organizations.<sup>3</sup> They impose costs upon the entire global economy by serving as sources of illicit trade in everything from drugs to human trafficking, and disrupting global supply chains and trade routes through such activities as piracy.<sup>4</sup> By lacking effective public health controls, they can literally serve as incubators for large-scale pandemics.<sup>5</sup> Fragile states are often accompanied with civil wars or ethnic violence, impacting nearby nations with spill-over violence, refugees, and residual instability.<sup>6</sup> Accordingly, the threat of fragile states figures prominently in U.S. strategic guidance, from the President's National Security Strategy, to the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the National Military Strategy.<sup>7</sup>

The range of military strategic approaches to address fragile states is broad and diverse. Some methods treat the mere symptoms of fragile states, such as counter-terrorism operations to combat terrorist cells. Other methods address deeper root causes of fragile states, such as stability and reconstruction (S&R) op-

erations to enable partner nations to more strongly govern themselves. After decades of involvement in S&R operations, to include immense commitment to S&R efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Department of Defense formally declared stability and reconstruction operations as core DoD competencies. In 2009, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3000.5 reiterated that U.S. military forces should “be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations” stability operations and to support reconstruction operations in conjunction with other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and international organizations.<sup>8</sup> Reiterating the importance of S&R operations, President Obama’s National Security Strategy (NSS) states, “We will...help states avoid becoming terrorist safe havens by helping them build their capacity for responsible governance and security through development and security sector assistance.”<sup>9</sup> The Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) of February, 2010 reinforces this approach with emphasis on assisting good governance in strategically important fragile states. The QDR states that “U.S. Armed Forces will continue to require capabilities to create a secure environment in fragile states...[and]... to support civil authorities in providing essential government services...”<sup>10</sup> Clearly S&R activities are crucial tools in America’s strategic toolkit.

America’s success rate at conducting S&R operations is mixed. Despite immense efforts undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan, the creation of politically stable states in both countries eludes the U.S., partner states, and international allies. Two years after American troops withdrew from Iraq, the Iraqi government took an astounding eight months to form a governing coalition, and many difficult political issues remain un-

resolved. Corruption, sectarianism, and violence are still prevalent in Iraq.<sup>11</sup> In Afghanistan, the effectiveness of the Taliban at running shadow governments opposed to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is evidence enough of that country's political weakness. The debate concerning the causes of the lack of U.S. success is extensive. Suggestions range from the lack of properly training forces to conduct S&R operations, to the ultimate futility of using military forces to conduct such adventures. Considering the prominence of fragile states in the strategic environment and U.S. strategic goals, it is inevitable that the U.S., and ultimately the U.S. military, will be involved in such endeavors. Therefore, American military performance must be improved. This paper argues that weaknesses in U.S. stability and reconstruction operations are intellectual in nature. **The U.S military, and to some extent the broader U.S. government, does not enunciate in official doctrine the centrality and causes of political instability in fragile states, and consequently stability and reconstruction operations are planned and executed devoid of political development efforts.** The first step towards bolstering U.S. S&R efforts is to address this weakness.

This paper will support the above thesis with the following arguments. First, that *political development* is at least as important, if not more important, as other crucial stability and reconstruction tasks such as economic development, social development, and overall governance development. Part of this argument includes the premise that political development has its own logic that must be purposefully pursued and not subordinated to other development efforts such as economics or governance.

The second argument is that *current U.S. military doctrine and strategy for stability and reconstruction* significantly contributes to political instability in weak or fragile nation-states. This is caused by three factors. The first factor is that the U.S. military approach to stability and reconstruction operations is executed in a 'blitzkrieg' manner without sufficient political development efforts. The resultant instability from this approach actually causes political decay, which contributes to further instability, and thus promotes a vicious cycle. Political decay results in Praetorian societies—societies without a shared civic culture.<sup>12</sup> The second factor is that military approaches over-emphasize the functions of *public output institutions* over *public input institutions* and hence unbalance political development in fragile states. The third factor is that U.S. policy currently overemphasizes voting over institutional development as the main effort for democratization and voting without effective institutions causes political instability.

Finally, the third argument of the paper, the corrective argument, is that U.S. military doctrine and strategy must address the role and formation of *political input institutions* in fragile states to foster political development and restore political stability. Integrating political input institutions into military doctrine and strategy will provide a foundation for practitioners to help fragile states. Before this may occur, however, there must be an intellectual discussion that highlights the significance of political development in military doctrine.

## Current Doctrine and Strategy: Omitting the Centrality of Political Development

The United States is considered the political pioneering nation of history. From the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to the domination of American scholars in the field of political science, U.S. history in political development is long and storied. It is ironic, therefore, that U.S. military doctrine and strategy for stability and reconstruction efforts so poorly integrates elements of political development. The DoDI 3000.5 lists four core stability tasks: establish civil security and civil control, restore or provide essential services, repair critical infrastructure, and provide humanitarian assistance. None of these address political development. Additionally, the DoDI lists four supporting tasks: disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating belligerents into civil society; rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces; strengthening governance and rule of law; and fostering economic stability and development.<sup>13</sup> Again, the DoDI does not specifically address political development, although strengthening governance and the rule of law does address some institutional capacity building. The stability and reconstruction policies and doctrine of non-DoD agencies more clearly acknowledge the importance of the political arena in S&R efforts. The *Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction* published by the U.S. Institute for Peace identifies the centrality of “political primacy” and chapter 8 of this document dedicates significant language concerning civic participation and empowerment as well as political moderation and accountability.<sup>14</sup> The *Fragile States Strategy* published by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

advocates several activities to foster more permanent political development in fragile states.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, there remain weaknesses in the broader U.S. government's policies and doctrine for stability and reconstruction. For example, the State Department's *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks* document includes provisions for political development—such as legislative strengthening, political party development, and fostering civil society organizations—but these tasks are subsumed under the broader category of governance and participation, and therefore lose their independence of approach.<sup>16</sup> While there remains room for improvement to the broader U.S. government approach to S&R operations, this paper is focused on weaknesses in U.S. *military* S&R doctrine and strategy and the conduct of *military-led* stability and reconstruction operations.

Political development related to operations and tactics is even more absent. Reflecting DoDI 3000.5, joint doctrine includes a chapter for governance and participation, with some paragraphs describing support to local governance and support for elections.<sup>17</sup> The joint doctrine correctly states that the Department of State and USAID are the lead agencies for these activities. Conversely, the Army's doctrine is also appropriately nested with these tasks, with sections covering support to local governance and support for elections, with similar stipulations that *civilian agencies* have the lead on governance efforts.<sup>18</sup> This doctrinal division of responsibility, however, does not reflect the recent reality of S&R efforts. At the tactical level, interagency and multi-national teams of both military and civilian experts work together to assist and empower host nation governments from the national to the local level. This is evidenced by the use of Provincial Reconstruc-

tion Teams (PRTs) in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and the use of District Support Teams (DSTs) and Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) in Afghanistan. Therefore, artificially separating governance development from economic and social development and security sector reform is both unrealistic and unhelpful.

Even at the tactical level military forces are challenged to conduct meaningful political development. This is largely attributable to the misunderstanding of what exactly is meant by political development. **Governance is not the same thing as politics.** Per JP 1-02 the *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, governance is defined as:

The state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority (JP 3-24).<sup>19</sup>

This is a good starting definition but it is digressive. The field of governance encompasses several academic disciplines such as public policy, public administration and political science, and unlike economics and social sciences, there is no agreed to definition of governance in academia. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler provide an insightful alternative definition for governance. To Osborne and Gaebler, "Governance is the process by which we collectively solve our problems and meet our society's needs."<sup>20</sup> To them, governance is the leadership of a society, and leadership can be exercised in both formal-authoritative measures and informal measures. While governance is broad, politics within the public environment specifically refers

to the process by which power and influence is organized within a society or more narrowly the government of a nation-state.<sup>21</sup> Underneath the umbrella of governance, political science has two academic cousins. The first is public policy, which is the study of decision-making processes in government and society.<sup>22</sup> The second is public administration, which is the study of how decisions in government (or the public) are executed or managed through specific programs and initiatives.<sup>23</sup> Politics, then, studies **who** influences public policy and public administration and **how** they exercise influence. Given this terminological framework, the joint definition of governance is imprecise. Politics is part of, not equivalent to, governance.

This omission of political development in military S&R doctrine would be understandable given that the U.S. military deems this domain outside its professional sphere of responsibility. What is concerning, however, is that two other major development disciplines—economic development and social development—are deemed important enough to receive extensive provisions in doctrine. Both JP 3-07 and FM 3-07 have separate chapters for economic development/stabilization. DoDI 3000.5 specifically identifies “fostering economic stability and development” as a key supporting task.<sup>24</sup> While well intentioned, the advancement of human rights and the rule of law in many traditional societies equates to social development. Both the advancement of human rights and rule of law are featured prominently in JP 3-07 and FM 3-07. Pursuit of economic and social development without accompanying political development, however, neglects the comprehensive effect that S&R operations seek.

The linking of economic, social and political development together into a single effort traces its intellectual roots back to modernization theories of the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century. Scientists and philosophers such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and American Talcott Parsons argued that all societies progressed on the same evolutionary path. Traditional societies—agrarian societies organized primarily into traditional social units such as tribes or clans—evolved into modern societies. Modern societies featured:

...a capitalist market economy and consequent large-scale division of labor; the emergence of strong, centralized, bureaucratic states; the shift from tightly knit village communities to impersonal urban ones; and the transition from communal to individualistic social relationships.<sup>25</sup>

Modernization theory concluded that all three forms of development were reciprocal and therefore advancements in one domain would facilitate advancements in the other. The American version of modernization skewed the theory even more by arguing that economic development and social reform had to *precede* political stability.<sup>26</sup> One of America's foremost modernization theorists was Walt Rostow, who was influential in U.S. policy circles and eventually became the National Security Advisor to President Lyndon Johnson. Consequently, tenants of modernization theory heavily influenced pacification strategies in Vietnam and the creation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program.<sup>27</sup> In the late 1960s, modernization theory came under heavy intellectual scrutiny, led primarily by Samuel Huntington, and fell out of favor in academia.<sup>28</sup> However, the triad approach to development is still reflected in current U.S. military S&R doctrine

and shows the long shadow of modernization theory in the U.S. military.

Modernization as a sound development strategy was discredited in academia starting in the late 1960's, starting with Samuel Huntington's seminal work on political development, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Much of Huntington's work informs the remainder of this paper. Modernization **as a process** by which traditional societies evolve into more advanced (or modern) societies still remains a field of study, though the idea that this process can be planned in a linear, sequential fashion is no longer accepted. What is uncontested, however, is that states undergoing modernization often experience instability and this instability can only be managed through well developed political institutions.<sup>29</sup> More recently, the subject of political development—specifically the development of political institutions—has been re-visited by scholars such as Francis Fukuyama in *The Origins of Political Development* and authors Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in *Why Nations Fail*.<sup>30</sup> These authors, and others, agree on the independence and centrality of political development in achieving political stability and national prosperity. Political development, therefore, should be taken seriously as its own line of effort in stability and reconstruction doctrine and strategy.

## **Current Doctrine and Strategy: Causes of Political Instability**

Not only does U.S. military doctrine and strategy for S&R operations omit and neglect the centrality and critical nature of political development, some aspects of the American approach to S&R operations are in fact de-stabilizing in nature. The first way that U.S. doctrine and strategy is destabilizing is related to

the legacy of modernization. By actively introducing economic and social reforms into a fragile state without corresponding political reforms, well intentioned S&R actors cause resistance to such reforms. Instead of progressing towards advanced societies, they regress into traditional praetorian forms of organization and behavior. The second way that U.S. doctrine and strategy destabilizes fragile states is by unbalancing developing governments with disproportional administrative power that is unchecked by accountability mechanisms. This creates powerful national governments that can become unresponsive to the desires of most of the society's citizens. The third way that U.S. doctrine and strategy destabilizes fragile states is by advocating mass, "raw voting" into political systems that are not well institutionalized. Contrary to popular belief, un-institutionalized voting is de-stabilizing to fragile states. These three effects work against any progress made by S&R activities.

### *The Blitzkrieg Development Approach.*

Military doctrine and strategy for S&R operations advocates a "whole of government" approach to fragile states, including economic development and humanitarian assistance. This is done on a broad geographic scale, and impacts all levels of society from the national through sub-national/provincial and local level. It is an approach that reflects the joint military principles of mass, objective and offensive. Samuel Huntington called this reform approach, aptly, the blitzkrieg approach.<sup>31</sup> In many ways, however, this blitzkrieg approach adds more instability than it fixes.

Fragile states often feature undeveloped economic systems. Negative or low Gross Domestic Product

(GDP), low per capita income, high unemployment and high poverty are typical symptoms of such undeveloped economies. Fragile states commonly lack the economic systems and institutions required to increase productivity, induce economic growth, and compete in the global economy. Some fragile states remain mired in sustenance agriculture-based economies, while others have illicit economies larger than legitimate ones. All of these conditions deter political development.

While undeveloped economic systems are problematic, rapidly growing economic systems can also be destabilizing, especially if this growth is artificially created by external actors and foreign entities. Well meaning S&R actors typically infuse huge amounts of resources into fragile states. It is well documented that this causes increased rates of corruption and criminal activity.<sup>32</sup> In many cases, however, despite corruption and inefficiency, influxes of resources do indeed cause rapid economic growth. While rapid economic growth is generally judged to be a good thing, it also has serious negative repercussions. Rapid economic growth greatly enhances the overall wealth in an economic system, but a disproportionate amount of this goes to those who already have relatively more wealth than those who don't. Hence, the wealth gap between the rich and the poor typically increases with rapid economic growth. Even if the absolute wealth of the lower classes increases, the disparity in relative wealth creates dissatisfaction among the lower classes. This incentivizes all sorts of disruptive behavior, ranging from theft or violent crime to organized protests and/or labor strikes.

A second negative repercussion of rapid economic growth is related to the first. While economic

inequality has a class dimension to it, there will also be economic disparity between traditional social units as they assimilate new economic wealth into their influence methods. Hence, certain ethnic and regional groups will benefit more from economic growth than others, which aggravates any existing rivalries or conflicts between ethnic and regional groups.<sup>33</sup>

A third negative repercussion of rapid economic growth is the empowerment of new groups of citizens who acquire new wealth and seek to use that wealth to act in other spheres of society, such as politics or social status. These new groups include occupational and skill classes ("blue collar"), as well as a rapidly expanding middle class. These new economic groupings challenge long established social identities and create a competition for political and social power within society using relatively new economic means. The empowerment of individuals expands beyond the economic arena. Economic growth and industrialization have been shown to be strongly correlated with rapidly increasing literacy, education, and exposure to information. Rapid economic growth, therefore, not only empowers individuals with new wealth but also with new skills and higher aspirations as they become aware of more (and possibly better) options for living their lives. Often, these new aspirations simply exceed what can be achieved by such empowered individuals, which creates further dissent among the citizenry. New job opportunities provide one possible option for aspiring citizens. Most job opportunities are located in urban settings, which causes a large migration from rural areas to urban areas and further causes a great deal of social disruption in society. The expanded empowerment of new classes of citizens, therefore, facilitates social instability, which is addressed in more depth in the next section.<sup>34</sup>

Social instability is a natural byproduct of the organizational evolution of societies from traditional to modern. Traditional societies are fundamentally organized into small, tightly knit social groups where individuals are either related through genetic linkages (relatives) or proximate relationships (frequent interactions) such as extended families, tribes, or clans. These social units develop their own culture, norms, and values which inform group members on how to behave, interact with one another, and indeed how to think and perceive things. Culture itself is a social defense mechanism for groups to deal with complexity and it often serves the function of causing groups to resist change.<sup>35</sup> This resistance manifests itself as undesirable behavior—social instability.

As discussed previously, economic modernization and economic growth facilitate social instability by empowering individuals and groups with new wealth, skills, and aspirations as well as introducing new identities based upon economic interests rather than traditional social linkages.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, “major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior.”<sup>37</sup> Opportunities for forming new patterns of socialization and behavior create competition between traditional groups and modernizing groups for power and influence in society. Often, this competition becomes violent. Violence further aggravates instability by forcing the competing forces to entrench in their positions rather than negotiating and seeking compromise.

The prevalence of distrust in [traditional] societies limits the individual loyalties to groups that are inti-

mate and familiar. [Traditional] people are and can be loyal to their clans, perhaps to their tribes, but not to broader political institutions [of the nation-state].<sup>38</sup>... Thus in a politically backward society lacking a sense of political community, each leader, each individual, each group pursues and is assumed to be pursuing its own immediate short-run material goals without consideration for any broader public interest.<sup>39</sup>

While artificial economic development induces both economic and social instability, S&R actors often introduce even more social instability with Western liberal social reforms. While initiated for good reasons, the introduction of minority rights, for example women's rights, creates social instability in traditional societies that dominate a large portion of fragile states. In fact, Samuel Huntington argued that "social mobilization is much more destabilizing than economic development."<sup>40</sup> Those social groups that will lose power as a result of the empowerment of other groups (ethnic minorities and women) in fragile states naturally bolster their efforts to retain their power bases. This consequently expands social instability and intensifies competition for influence and power. The point of this argument is not that these goals are bad nor that S&R actors should not foster them; rather, the point is that such reforms induce instability into an environment that already has plenty of instability. If such reforms are introduced into fragile states, they should be introduced as part of a political system that takes into account the views of both sides of the social power context, a challenging but value-added task.

The blitzkrieg development approach in U.S. military S&R doctrine and strategy adds to instability in fragile states. Economic aid and development aggravates corruption and crime, as well as de-stabilizes the social fabric of traditional societies. This social in-

stability is further aggravated through the subtle imposition of Western, liberal social reforms such as minority rights and widespread access to social goods. Economic and social instability must be balanced with political development. United States stability and reconstruction doctrine and strategy, however, actually causes political **decay** by creating national governments too powerful for the societies they rule to balance them.

*Unbalanced Governments Cause Political Decay.*

Both JP 3-07 and FM 3-07 assign military forces a litany of tasks to restore host-nation governance, or as this paper has made clear, more precisely called public administration. Recent experience in stability operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan reinforces this fact.<sup>41</sup> Forces in both campaigns have undertaken government functions in everything from establishing public order and law enforcement to restoring essential services using SWEAT-MS.<sup>42</sup> Political scientists have named the institutions / agencies that perform these functions of government as **output institutions**, because they provide the “output” of government. The counterpart institutions to output institutions are **input institutions**, those legitimate organizations in society that facilitate the citizen “input” and involvement into the political system, such as legislatures, political parties and interest groups.<sup>43</sup> Both types of institutions are critical to well functioning governance and political stability. Current U.S. military doctrine, however, is lacking on provisions for input institutions.

The overemphasis on output institutions by most S&R actors, including the U.S., has three unintended

consequences. The first consequence is the lack of developing strong input institutions leaves large swaths of society without mechanisms through which to voice their needs, desires and grievances into the political system. The Western solution to this problem—democratic voting—has many of its own drawbacks and the next section of this paper will demonstrate how “raw voting” is actually destabilizing in nature. The second consequence is that creating powerful output institutions can create a new class of bureaucratic rulers in a society. Without mechanisms for government accountability—such as input institutions—these new rulers consolidate the government’s power into their own hands, a form of oligarchy. Political systems organized like this appear to be well functioning, but underneath are not resilient to rapid changes in the environment or their own societies. They often succumb to military coups or popular uprisings, as the Arab Spring has demonstrated.

The third consequence of overpowering national governments is the creation of **societal friction**, which contributes to political decay. Political decay is the reversion of societal organization from modern political institutions—such as political parties, civic organizations, and interest groups—into more traditional institutions—such as patron-client networks, tribes or clans. Societal friction is the tendency of a society (or social units) to resist reforms towards more advanced institutions or systems of organization. While people (including Westerners) who resist change are often depicted as ill-informed, backwards, and even selfish, in actuality the resistance to change, especially highly disruptive change, is a natural human tendency. In COIN scholarship, this resistance to change has been called “the accidental guerilla syndrome.”<sup>44</sup> Its political cousin is “the accidental traditionalist syndrome.”

Societal friction manifests itself in many forms during S&R operations: bribery, corruption, hoarding of power (kleptocracy), nepotism, cronyism, coercion, violence; the list could be much longer. These activities are manifestations of social units attempting to preserve their power and influence in society against new competitive (or threatening) forces brought about by modernization, such as a newly empowered national government. They are considered inappropriate within the context of laws and policies established by the central government. Societal friction, therefore, is a social defense mechanism against political modernization. In a way, instability in fragile states forces citizens to choose between the unknown future (a modern society) and what they already know (traditional society). Consequently, by creating a powerful central government, S&R actors may be actually creating more “traditionalists” than “modernists” (supporters of modernism). These are “accidental traditionalists.”

Accidental traditionalists cling to their social units of organization versus adopting new models of political organization. These traditional social units seek to maintain and even advance their own influence, and therefore they join patron-client networks. A patron-client relationship is “one of exchange in which a party (the patron) allocates a resource or is capable of providing a service to another party (client) who needs it and is ready to exchange temporary loyalty, general support, and assistance for it.”<sup>45</sup> Patron-client relationships allow the networking of traditional social units in order for social units to obtain specific goals. What differentiates patron-client networks from more evolved and mature principal-agent networks is that in patron-client networks, the social units retain their strong social identities, whereas in principal-

agent networks there are structural measures taken for agents to take on identity characteristics of the principals.<sup>46</sup> In contemporary S&R operations, patron-client networks have been labeled criminal networks or networks of corruption. Adding insult to injury, for the sake of expediency, many forces conducting S&R operations cooperate and collaborate (knowingly and unknowingly) with corrupt officials who use coalition resources to build and expand their patron-client networks. Patron-client networks and traditional social units are less evolved forms of political organization. Hence, by strengthening the national government's output institutions, S&R actors incentivize societies to revert in political organization. They induce political decay by over-focusing on output institutions and they aggravate it further by advocating premature elections.

### *Democracy as a Source of Instability.*

While counterintuitive to a Western audience, there is significant research that indicates that rapid democratization of a society without sufficient political institutionalization is actually disruptive to that society. "Raw voting" is the rapid expansion of widespread voting suffrage without sufficient institutionalization to ensure voting is representative of the needs and desires of all citizens. For starters, the expansion of participation in the decisions of government, such as raw voting, threatens the rule of elites in a society and causes them to entrench their positions and increase their efforts (licit and illicit) at influence. One of the consequent results of this is the intensification of patron-client networks as elites expend more resources to solidify loyalties with their clients, who consequently use this new wealth and power to solidify the

loyalty of their own clients. This also creates significant incentives for patrons (elites) to steal clients from competing patrons. Secondly, rapid democratization raises the individual aspirations and expectations of average citizens, many of whom have previously had no hope of input into the system of governance. These aspirations and expectations quickly exceed what the system can provide. This creates discontent. Voters consequently use alternative methods to voice their views and interests (protests, organization, violence, etc.), and willingly join patron-client networks in an effort to increase their own influence.

Democratization in and of itself is not a stabilizing force. Most Western democracies have benefitted from the concurrent rise of constitutional liberalism with their democratic participation. “Constitutional liberalism...is not about the procedures for selecting government, but rather the government’s goals.”<sup>47</sup> In the spirit of John Locke, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, constitutional liberalism seeks not to maximize the power of the government but rather to limit it. Constitutional liberalism is a political system “marked...by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.”<sup>48</sup> Because constitutional liberalism and mass democracy grew simultaneously in the West, they are often assumed to go together, but this is an incorrect assumption. As Robert Dahl put it:

Liberalism, either as a conception of political liberty, or as a doctrine about economic policy, may have coincided with the rise of democracy. But it has never been immutably or unambiguously linked to its practice.<sup>49</sup>

Indeed, Fareed Zakaria argues that the modern spread of democracy in the world has brought more

*illiberal democracies* than constitutional liberal democracies. Illiberal democracies are democratic governments that feature elections without the real freedom to choose by voters. Democratically elected autocratic regimes or single party governments are examples of typical illiberal democracies. Elections are used only as approval referendums for existing regimes; there is no real competition for the rule of the government at stake. Illiberal democracies use the guise of popular support to expand the authority and power of the ruling regime, to usurp transparency and accountability, and to restrict or even revoke basic liberties of citizens. Zakaria notes that half of “democratizing” countries in the world today are [classified] as illiberal democracies.<sup>50</sup>

It takes more than a written constitution to classify a nation as a constitutional liberal government. The political system that is grown in a developing nation must have systemic features that allow for competition between groups seeking to influence the government. Competition between groups is permitted when the government and the ruling regime that controls the government cannot infringe upon the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly, the protection of property (such as financial) and the protection of ideas, such as the freedom of religion. In his seminal work *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Robert Dahl categorized the three main criteria for a competitive form of government—a government that is responsive to the preferences of its citizens:<sup>51</sup>

- The ability to formulate preferences unimpaired by the ruling regime;
- The ability for citizens to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action unimpeded by the ruling regime;

- The ability to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference.

Participative democracies, therefore, are not solely the function of the amount of voting that citizens are allowed to do. The other variable is the amount of *public contestation* allowed in the political system. Public contestation is roughly defined as 'the ability of various groups to fairly compete for influence in the government'.<sup>52</sup> Without public contestation, the ruling regime merely solidifies its hold on the control of the government. As Figure 1 illustrates, governments with no public contestation and no participation are the all too familiar autocratic regimes that have become unsupportable in the modern world; Dahl labels these governments *closed hegemonies* (monarchies are good examples of closed hegemonies).




Figure 1 – Dahl's Model of Polyarchy

The *inclusive hegemonies*, those governments with wide participation but little public contestation, in-

clude Zakaria's illiberal democracies (the former Soviet Union or the present-day China are good examples of inclusive hegemonies). In the upper left hand corner of the chart are governments with a great deal of public contestation and competition for power, but with little participation. Dahl calls these *competitive oligarchies* (examples include the early republican forms of government in the United States and England which allowed only land owning males to vote). Finally, in the upper right hand corner are those governments with a high degree of participation and a high degree of public contestation, which Dahl labels *polyarchies* (Dahl would argue that the United States is a polyarchy). Dahl uses the label polyarchy to distinguish this form of government from the more simple democracy; a democracy's only true requirement is widespread participation without regard to competition for ideas. A polyarchy is a form of government that allows for true competition for power and influence in the political system.<sup>53</sup>

It is clear from this sample of political science research, therefore, that a democratic form of government is not naturally the equivalent to a stable form of government. The assumption that "democracy = good governance" is an oversimplification of many concurrent trends in Western politics that Huntington called the incorrect belief in the unity of goodness:

In confronting the modernizing countries the United States was handicapped by its happy history. In its development the United States was blessed with more than its fair share of economic plenty, social well-being, and political stability. This pleasant conjuncture of blessings led Americans to believe in the **unity of goodness** [author's emphasis]: to assume all good things go together and that the achievement of one

desirable social goal aids in the achievement of the others.<sup>54</sup>

As this paper has shown, economic and social development, combined with un-institutionalized voting, is highly de-stabilizing in fragile states. Emphasis on political development can alleviate much of this instability, and the major aspect of political development currently missing from U.S. military S&R doctrine and strategy is the development of input institutions.

### **The Importance of Input Institutions in Political Stability**

This paper, thus far, has shown that U.S. military S&R doctrine and strategy both neglects the importance of political development in stabilizing fragile states, and also fosters instability through the blitzkrieg modernization approach, an over-focus on output institutions, and advocating premature elections. One key facet of political development that is missing from U.S. military doctrine is the importance of input institutions.

#### *Critical Functions of Input Institutions.*

To readers from primarily Western nations, providing for input institutions may seem as simple as introducing universal voting into a society. As discussed previously, however, voting alone does not define institutionalization. Indeed, as the section on political instability revealed, there is significant scholarship to suggest that “un-institutionalized democracy” and “raw voting” are actually destabilizing. Therefore,

voting must be organized by input institutions. Input institutions perform several critical functions for a political system, to include:

- Organize political participation;
- Linking social forces to the government;<sup>55</sup>
- Interest aggregation and articulation;
- Constructively compete with other political institutions and the government to further interests;<sup>56</sup>
- Recruit new members and mobilize voters;<sup>57</sup> and
- Hold public leaders and institutions accountable to citizens.

The first political function that input institutions perform is the organization of political participation. Input institutions promote political participation by organizing citizens into cohesive groups that agree to exert influence only within the rules (laws) of the political system. Most readers will easily grasp the need to form individual citizens into cohesive groups for political participation. When individual citizens act totally independent of other citizens, this creates confusion and chaos. No consensus and collaboration can gain momentum in such a system. Collecting individual citizens into cohesive groups, therefore, is not the real challenge of organizing political participation. The challenge of a modern political system is to funnel the efforts of citizen groups into the rules of the political system. In a traditional society, social units – families, tribes, clans – dominate. There are no shared interests; there is no public good. “[I]n a politically backward society lacking a sense of political community, each leader, each individual, each group pursues and is assumed to be pursuing its own immediate short-run

material goals without consideration for any broader public interest.”<sup>58</sup> Traditional societies quickly degenerate into Hobbe’s “war of every man against every man.”<sup>59</sup> Political input institutions, therefore, not only organize citizens into cohesive groups that acknowledge the authority of the political system, but channel the energies of traditional social units into the political system as well.

The second political function that input institutions provide is linking social forces to the government by assimilating them into the political system. In traditional societies that lack a political (or national) identity, not only are the actors attempting to influence politics extremely diverse (tribes, clans, patronage networks), “but so also are the methods used to decide upon office and policy. Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities.”<sup>60</sup> Those social units with wealth may bribe; those social units that are large may use numbers to influence; those social units that are militant tend to use violence to achieve their goals. The means of influence are as varied as the nature of the groups. To subsume this behavior, political input institutions replace social identities with political identities where common interests can be linked between groups for the aggregation of interests into a larger political body. Modernizing societies typically experience the expansion of the number of possible identities for citizens to assume (jobs, economic class, etc.). Political input institutions thus create new political identities for aggregation outside of traditional social identities. “Kinship, racial, and religious groupings are supplemented by occupational, class, and skill groupings,” where the interests of the new groupings are more easily merged.<sup>61</sup> By providing new, more modern political identities,

input institutions link existing social forces to the government.

The third function that political input institutions conduct is interest aggregation and articulation. Interest aggregation is not simply the sum of interests of individual social units conglomerated for the purpose of sheer numbers, nor is it the convergence of social units upon a single interest. Patron-client relationships establish temporary loyalties by focusing all co-opted members on a single interest—but as soon as the clients can obtain this goal by other means, they change loyalties to a new patron. Interest aggregation is the creation of new, unified interests through negotiation, compromise, and collaboration of many interests of formerly divided groups. Hence, when groups are linked through aggregated interests, they can no longer achieve those interests on their own through another means. The aggregated interests are organic to the new linkage; formerly divided groups are now bound by shared interests. Interest aggregation is important not only because it forms lasting loyalties between formerly divided groups. It also facilitates the identification of political identities to replace social identities. For example, social identities tend to be geographically centered because of the need for face-to-face interaction of social members. Through interest aggregation, however, political identities can be de-linked from geography because interests need not be tied to specific geography.

Having replaced social identities with political identities, linked disparate groups through interest aggregation, and organized citizens into groups that exercise political authority through legitimate means of the political system, the fourth function that input institutions conduct is fostering constructive competi-

tion in the political arena. Because input institutions must be considered legitimate in order to participate in the political system, they must follow “the rules” of the political system (non-violence, support to the system of governance, etc.) and they enforce compliance of the rules by their members. Input institutions socialize and enforce norms of political behavior by their members. They foster unified communication by their members, and hence provide a larger voice than individual citizens or even small social units could demand. In this manner, input institutions foster constructive competition in the political arena.

Input institutions help political systems overcome traditionalist social forces in order to assimilate those forces into the political system; through this process, input institutions consolidate existing political power into the legitimate system of society. Input institutions also **increase** the overall amount of political power in the system; they do this by expanding participation in the system. This is the fifth function of input institutions—recruiting new members and mobilizing voters. With respect to this function, micro-economics provides a useful analogy. Economic policies are fundamentally focused on two primary macro variables: the amount of wealth being created by the economy and the distribution of the wealth in the economy. Firms (i.e. businesses) are the “front line” organizing institutions of economies. Based upon the dynamics of the economic system and the policies of the regulating government, firms generate new wealth and distribute the wealth by the logic of the economic system. In the same way, input institutions are the “front line” organizing institutions of political systems. Input institutions distribute political power through interest aggregation and organization. Input institutions also create more political power in the system by recruiting

new members/voters who previously did not participate in politics. In this view, voter recruitment is not the job of the government in power but the function of input institutions that are autonomous.<sup>62</sup>

One of the most critical aspects of expanding political participation is the linking of urban and rural populations together into shared interests.<sup>63</sup> In developing nations, urban populations tend to be more educated, relatively wealthier (due to more job opportunities), and more aware of new ideas and viewpoints, due to their exposure to the media and the world outside the immediate society. Urban populations, therefore, tend to lead societies in terms of development because they are accustom to change, while rural populations often resist development and are left behind. Linking these two disparate populations together is a critical function of political input institutions.

The sixth and final political function of input institutions is to hold public leaders and other institutions accountable to citizens. By organizing citizens, input institutions lend credibility to citizen concerns and questions. Because input institutions are legitimate in the political system (as opposed to social units that can be excluded), their grievances must be addressed, especially if several input institutions aggregate their interests to command even more attention. By monitoring agent behavior in the political system, input institutions prevent corruption – the use of public positions to achieve personal gains.

Corruption thrives on disorganization, the absence of stable relationships among groups and of recognized patterns of authority. The development of political organizations which exercise effective authority and which give rise to organized interests...transcend those of individual and social groups [and] reduces the opportunity for corruption.<sup>64</sup>

In this way, input institutions help reduce corruption. This is just one example of how input institutions facilitate political accountability.

It is clear that input institutions perform critical functions for the stability of a political system. The simple performance of these functions, however, is not enough to foster stability. These functions must be institutionalized – organized into recurring patterns of behavior that sustain these functions despite individual leadership. In short, developing nations and external powers assisting them must foster **strong** input institutions. It is prudent, then, to discuss the characteristics of strong input institutions.

### *Characteristics of Strong Input Institutions.*

The branch of institutionalism in modern political science is devoted to the study of the role of institutions in politics. Entire libraries have been written on the subject of how to assess the effectiveness of political institutions. For simplicity and to remain consistent with the original research on the subject of input institutions, this paper will use Huntington's criteria for well developed institutions. Huntington believed that strong input institutions have four primary characteristics, which will be discussed in this section:<sup>65</sup>

- Adaptability
- Complexity
- Autonomy
- Coherence

Each characteristic will be defined in general terms, with illustrative examples provided for further

understanding. Then possible assessment criteria will be addressed to provide a framework for evaluating input institutions in developing nations.

*Adaptability.* An adaptable institution is able to innovate quickly in order to meet changing dynamics. Changing dynamics can be internal, such as personnel turnover or evolving skill sets of employees, or external demands from the political environment, most notably the needs of citizens. Input institutions can be considered adaptable if they can efficiently recruit and absorb new members, or even better, successfully build a diverse membership through interest aggregation. Increasing membership expands the political power of the institution. Input institutions also display adaptability by shifting their policy platforms and interest positions in accordance with the political environment; they stay in touch with what members and voters want in the immediate timeframe. Huntington believed that adaptability could be measured with three criteria: institutional maturity, generational longevity, and functional adaptability.

Institutional maturity is a function of chronological age. As organizations exist longer, they evolve and develop sophisticated means of operating, as well as culture and norms. Maturity gives the institution redundancy and resiliency, which allows it to withstand shocks and upheavals. Institutional maturity, however, can become a negative factor in adaptability if the culture of the organization becomes overly rigid and ingrained. That is why institutional maturity is balanced against generational longevity, which is the ability of the institution to undergo controlled leadership and personnel changes. When an institution can do this smoothly, this means the institution has other informal means for preserving its values and identity

that exceed the personalities of individuals. Finally, functional adaptability is the ability of the institution to change (or replace) its core functions to meet new demands. If an input institution can modify its recruiting functions from face-to-face methods to more advanced methods (i.e. the internet), the institution has shown functional adaptability. Institutional maturity, generational longevity, and functional adaptability, therefore, can be used to assess overall institutional adaptability.<sup>66</sup>

*Complexity.* Huntington defined institutional complexity as the:

...multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits. The greater the number and variety of subunits the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members.<sup>67</sup>

As input institutions take on more and more tasks and functions, they must necessarily specialize sub-units in order to divide labor and maintain efficiency. This diversity and specialization makes the institution more robust as well as more efficient. This principle is also applied to the political system as a whole. A system is more robust with diversity, functionality and specialization. “The simple forms of government [monarchy, kleptocracy] [are] more likely to degenerate; the ‘mixed state’ was more likely to be stable.”<sup>68</sup> Hence, some possible criteria to measure institutional complexity might include the number of internal specialized branches of the institution and the number of external functions of the institution.

*Autonomy.* “A third measure of institutionalization is the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings

and methods of behavior.”<sup>69</sup> For input institutions to be autonomous, they cannot be driven by a sole social unit, no matter how large the group is (for example, large tribes in fragile states). Political institutions of both type (input and output) must have the ability to contest methods that the system does not authorize, such as procedures “to minimize, if not to eliminate, the role of violence in the system and to restrict to explicitly defined [i.e. legal] channels the influence of wealth in the system.”<sup>70</sup> Diversity of membership, employees, leaders, and resources are possible measurement criteria for the autonomy of input institutions.

*Coherence.* Institutions are said to have coherence when the members or participants of the institution are in substantial agreement on the functional boundaries of the institution and on the procedures for resolving disputes (i.e. debates) which occur inside those boundaries. Coherence is similar to cohesion, but while cohesion refers to social bonding within a group, coherence is functional agreement. Still, Huntington aptly stated that, “unity, esprit, morale, and discipline are needed in [institutions] as well as in regiments.”<sup>71</sup> In this sense, coherence may be the most difficult of the characteristics to assess. One criterion that could be used to measure coherence could possibly be the amount of deviant behavior (i.e. outside the agreed to boundaries) observed from the institution. Coherence may only be verified when the institution undergoes extreme duress, and how well the institution deals with that duress.


Input institutions perform vital functions in political systems. The development of strong input institutions is critical to fostering political stability in fragile and developing states. Equally important for political development is the expansion of participation in polit-

ical systems, to make them more pluralistic. Balancing participation and institutionalization is a challenge. Fortunately, political science provides a tool by which to assess this balance.

## **The Role of Input Institutions in Political Stability**

### *The Political Stability Model.*

Huntington provided a useful model to discuss the development of political input institutions and their role in political stability. The model is depicted in Figure 2. Along the X-axis is the amount of political participation in a system, increasing left to right. The X-axis is further divided into three sections that represent different degrees of political involvement. The far left section labeled “Low” is where politics is the domain of elites only. The middle section labeled “Medium” is traditionally the domain of the middle class or for those societies that do not develop a classic middle class, the politically active class – the urban elites. The far right section labeled “High” is where there is widespread participation of society in politics – the populace at large. The X-axis is contrasted to the Y-axis which is the amount of institutionalization in the political system (Huntington implies that this institutionalization is for input institutions). Institutionalization is generally defined as the propensity of the actors (institutions, groups, individuals) within the system to act in accordance with agreed to, stable and recurring patterns of political behavior.<sup>72</sup> When the two axes are transposed against one another, they create an X-Y Chart. This X-Y Chart, Huntington’s Political Stability Model, can be used to typify political systems by stability.



**Figure 2 – Huntington’s Political Stability Model (modified)<sup>73</sup>**

The term “praetorian society” was first used by Huntington in *Political Order in Changing Societies*. The term “praetorian” is used to typify a political system in which the social forces of society dominate the political system rather than political forces dominating the political system and hence stabilizing society:

“In all societies specialized social groups engage in politics. What makes such groups seem more ‘politicized’ in a praetorian society is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political actions...no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts.”<sup>74</sup>

The opposite of a praetorian society is a *civic society*, a society in which there is widespread agreement as to the legitimacy of the political system, which con-

sequently fosters constructive competition, cooperation, and collaboration between political institutions and social groups towards a common interest—the national interest.<sup>75</sup> The goal for developing nations, fragile states and those assisting them is to balance the two variables on the civic side of the equation.

### *Forms of Political Systems, by Degree of Stability.*

Many critical reports and papers written about weak or failed states throw around an assortment of “a-cracies” to describe these struggling nations: kleptocracy, oligarchy, autocracy, etc. This has been less than helpful to those attempting to develop governance in these states. Often these terms are thrown around loosely without clearly defining them or identifying how these “a-cracies” help the S&R actors define the problems associated with weak governance. Huntington’s Political Stability Model can give interagency partners and strategic decision-makers a means by which to calibrate these various “a-cracies” or what they should more properly be called—political systems.

The key theme that Huntington’s Political Stability Model illustrates is that *civic* forms of political systems (as identified above the diagonal line cross-cutting the model) require a high degree of political institutionalization in proportion to the amount of political participation into the system. This institutionalization is done by input institutions through the critical functions discussed previously. **The failure to balance political participation with institutionalization creates praetorian societies.** This theme is consistent with the previous discussion concerning how the rapid introduction of democracy into a traditional society is actually

destabilizing. In fact, *public contestation*, Robert Dahl's second requirement for stable polyarchies, is directly related to political institutionalization.<sup>76</sup> The model, therefore, is logically consistent with the political science research reviewed in this paper previously. The model is intended only as a frame of reference to better understand the degree of stability in a given political system based upon two critical variables, the degree of participation and the degree of institutionalization. Huntington himself stated, "To analyze changes in both dimensions, however, it is necessary to identify different categories of systems, recognizing full well that rarely will any actual political system in fact fit into any specific theoretically defined pigeonhole."<sup>77</sup> The model is not intended for S&R actors to use it to classify weak or failed states as either a "kleptocracy" or an "oligarchy." However, when future authors and analysts use these terms, hopefully they will pay more attention to what exactly these terms mean in terms of political stability.

The model requires one disclaimer prior to a more detailed discussion of the forms of political systems. It is important to note that "institutionalization" and "liberal constitutionalism" are not the same; a political system can have a high degree of institutionalization and not be protective of individual rights in the Western sense. The only requirement of institutionalization is that the actors agree to act in stable, recurring patterns of political behavior; this definition is value-neutral and allows for institutionalization in different cultures and different systems of government than Western, liberal constitutionalist democracies. This is an important concept required to understand Huntington's *organic* and *whig* categories of political systems.

## *Civic Political Systems.*

As the model graphically depicts, it is possible for civic political systems to exist at all points along the spectrum of political participation. Those political systems that feature a high degree of institutionalization but a low degree of political participation are classified as *organic*. The term organic is used because such political systems came into existence before the world “modernized,” or in other words, before the world was vastly influenced by the enlightenment, the industrial revolution, and other “modern” trends. These political systems feature extreme concentration of political power either in a single ruler or a ruler and his or her most trusted agents. Monarchies, both traditional (in the divinely justified sense) and constitutional (such as England) are organic political systems. In some nations, monarchies were augmented with bureaucracies where the leaders were directly appointed by the monarch, a political system typically called a bureaucratic empire. In some nations, monarchs were supported by feudal systems, a patriarchic form of patron-client, network-style governance. In feudal systems, lords are granted great autonomy over their lands in return for support to the monarch. Authority was passed down through bloodlines. The modern form of organic political systems is known as autocratic, where a single ruler consolidates disproportionate amounts of political power under their direct influence. The most extreme form of autocratic leaders are totalitarian dictators, but today many autocratic leaders use “rubber stamp” elections to legitimize their rule.

Those political systems that have a high degree of institutionalization and a moderate (medium) degree of political participation are classified as *whig* (this is a category of political system, not to be confused with

any political party using the ‘whig’ name). Huntington borrows the name for this category of political system from the American Whig Party of the 1830s to the 1850s which was a counter-movement to offset the domination of American government by the Jacksonian Democrats who favored a very powerful president. A whig style of government features a more powerful legislative branch that balances the powerful executive branch. Constitutional monarchies were the earliest forms of whig style governments. The Roman Senate performed this function in the pre-Caesar Roman Empire, and the English monarchy also evolved into a whig style of government. In the modern era, whig governments tend to have representative bodies that are not elected directly by citizens. For example, prior to the passage of the 17<sup>th</sup> Amendment in 1913, U.S. Senators were elected by the state legislatures. The *Meshrano Jirga* in Afghanistan is a similar whig legislative organization: one third of the *Meshrano* representatives are appointed by the President of Afghanistan, one third of the representatives are selected by Provincial Councils, and the other one third are selected by the District Councils. There is no direct voting by the Afghan population for the members of the *Meshrano Jirga*.<sup>78</sup>

Finally, those civic political systems that have a high degree of institutionalization and a high degree of political participation are *participative*. Huntington places constitutional democracies in this category, but the use of Robert Dahl’s term polyarchy is probably more accurate. A polyarchy, by strict definition, is a state ruled by more than one person; Dahl uses the term to classify governments that facilitate the rule of many competitive groups all working towards a shared interest. At this level of participation, it is very

hard for governments in power to sustain their legitimacy without widespread protection of individual rights and freedom. Hence, seemingly necessary requirements of participative political systems include: the protection of individual rights, the protection of minority group statuses, the rule of law, and the ability to transition power peacefully from one ruling regime (i.e. political party) to another.

What all these forms of *civic* political systems have in common is stability—defined as ‘agreed to, stable, recurring patterns of behavior in the influence of the government and/or society’. Civic political systems achieve stability by balancing political participation and institutionalization. Key features of this institutionalization include strong input institutions that are mature and developed enough to conduct their critical functions, in addition to fostering constructive competitiveness in the political arena. In the opposite type of system with weak institutionalization—the praetorian political system—instability is the result.

### *Praetorian Political Systems.*

In praetorian political systems, input institutions are not mature or developed enough to organize participation, aggregate interests, link social forces to the government, or perform any of the other critical functions of input institutions. Praetorian political systems are inherently unstable, and the failure to build strong input institutions merely reinforces the destabilizing economic, social and political forces that create praetorian societies in the first place. Many fragile and failing states fit the accepted definition of a praetorian society.

At the spectrum of Huntington’s model where institutionalization is low and the amount of participa-

tion is low lie the *elitist* praetorian political systems. These systems are dominated by elites who hoard power for their own benefit and the benefit of their loyal clients; self-serving patron-client networks are endemic of elitist praetorian political systems. Elites are primarily focused on increasing their own power. It is in this category where kleptocracies fall. A kleptocracy is a form of government where those leading the established government use their official positions and political power for their private gain and to solidify their personal political power or the political power of their patron-client networks. The term literally means the “rule of thieves.” Widespread corruption is one indicator of the presence of a kleptocracy.

While corruption is an indicator of the presence of a kleptocracy, it should be cautioned that the presence of corruption in society does not automatically mean the political system is kleptocratic. Corruption is simply the use of public position for private gain. Corruption can occur at the micro-level as well as the macro-level. Micro-level corruption can occur when government employees use their official positions to extract bribes or favors. Micro-level corruption is primarily the failure of the agency (or ministry) that the employee works for (called output institutions) to ensure the employee acts in accordance with the public’s interest. Macro-level corruption, however, is the stronger indicator of kleptocracy. In this case, the presence of corruption is both tolerated and possibly even encouraged by those with the most political power, and consequently those with the most ability to reduce it. Widespread corruption, therefore, is not sufficient to declare a political system a kleptocracy. The corruption must be systemic – it must be part of the acknowledged operating methods of the system.

As political participation in the system increases, praetorian political systems evolve into what Huntington called *radical* societies. Huntington used this term not simply to describe political systems that are controlled by extreme sections of society (which may be true). Instead, he used the term *radical* to characterize their instability. In radical systems, political participation (such as an increase in the number of non-elites seeking to influence the government in power) expands so that political power exceeds the direct control of elites. New social units (families, tribes, clans) enter into competition with first elites then other social units for influence in the government and society. Because these social units are still traditional, they compete for power in accordance with their nature. Unlike its civic-counterpart (*whig*), a radical society lacks mature and developed input institutions to facilitate constructive political competition. Consequently, a radical society features increased disruptive competition, competition that often reflects negative practices. In its most extreme form, a radical society experiences politically motivated violence.

The instability of a radical society is also caused by wide-ranging fluctuations in what groups dominate control of the system at any given time. Huntington described it well:

Authority over the system as a whole is transitory, and the weakness of political institutions means that authority and office are easily acquired and easily lost. Consequently, no incentive exists for a leader or a group to make significant concessions in search for authority. The changes which individuals make are thus imposed by the transfer of allegiance from one social group to another, rather than broadening of loyalty from a limited social group to a political in-

stitution embodying a multiplicity of interests. Hence the common phenomenon in praetorian politics of the ‘sell out’.<sup>79</sup>

The ‘sell out’ Huntington referred to is the constant flipping of clients among patrons in the various inter-related patron-client networks. This is why U.S. efforts to combat corruption through the arrest of corrupt officials (the Western way) are so ineffective in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Key leaders and/or key personnel removed (or marginalized) from criminal patronage networks are easily replaced. The patrons merely “buy” different clients. In fact, having to buy new clients possibly provides the patron in question new venues into other patron-client networks, and inherently changes the competitive dynamics of the political system.

At the top tier of the radical society (just under the diagonal line in Figure 2) is the most institutionalized form of a radical political system—the well known oligarchy. An oligarchy is a form of power structure in which power effectively rests with a small segment of society and this arrangement is sanctioned by the government in power (i.e. the state). Traditional oligarchies evolved from monarchical patron-client networks, or patronage bureaucracies. Economic modernization and growth help foster economic oligarchies, sometimes called a corporatist political system. Oligarchies can be dominated by professional classes; examples of these include technocracies (political systems dominated by a particular technical profession) and military juntas. In practice, oligarchies consist of a combination of all these classes. What distinguishes oligarchies as radical societies is the amount of un-institutionalized competition for control of the political

system. Oligarchies are prone to abrupt regime changes and overthrows such as military coups.

The praetorian system that features the greatest political participation Huntington classified as the *mass* society. In a mass society, the degree of competition increases so rapidly in proportion to the slow pace of institutionalization, that competition becomes virtually chaotic. This expansion is usually the result of the predominant demographic group entering politics for the first time, and in traditional societies this has historically been the rural population. Urban elites, who are competing for political power in a radical political system (oligarchy), and who neglect to attend to the political needs and desires of the rural masses, are suddenly overwhelmed when rural populations enter politics, usually in a disruptive fashion. The most extreme form of a mass political system is the revolution, a “rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies.”<sup>80</sup> Its milder cousin is the illiberal democracy, which features a moderate degree of institutionalization with widespread political participation.

As stated earlier, the Political Stability Model is not intended to definitively categorize a particular nation’s system of politics. It is intended, however, to stimulate thinking about the relationship between political participation and institutionalization of input institutions. Many military and interagency personnel recently involved in stability operations will quickly recall experiencing the symptoms of praetorian political systems. Awareness of political instability, and some of its causes, is the first step in rectifying American neglect of political development. Adjusting U.S.

military doctrine and strategy for stability and reconstruction operations is the next step.

## **Fostering the Growth of Input Institutions**

Fragile states and their destabilizing effects will continue to be prominent features of the future operational environment. Those involved in future stability and reconstruction operations, including the U.S. military, must better understand the dynamics of fragile states in order to successfully stabilize them. To do this, the U.S. will need to make modifications to doctrine, strategic approaches, and operational/tactical methods.

### *Doctrine Recommendations.*

United States military doctrine should be modified to acknowledge the separate domains of economic development, social development, and political development. Doctrine should also identify the sub-components of governance—public policy and public administration. While focus on restoring essential services and establishing civil authority is important, especially at the local level, such efforts need to be balanced with existing input institutions where they exist, or if they don't, on identifying organizations that can perform this function, such as civil society organizations (CSOs).<sup>81</sup> Doctrine should also temper its enthusiasm for economic development and the external imposition of human rights as drivers of stability.

While doctrine supports the U.S. foreign policy of advancing democracy globally, the emphasis on holding elections should be moderated. More emphasis on helping various population groups to organize politically—the key theme of developing input in-

stitutions—should be undertaken to provide citizen ownership of democratic processes. While the State Department’s *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks* list includes provisions for developing political parties and civil society groups, there should be more definitive policy on how these efforts are undertaken. For example, the current *Post-Conflict* document advocates the creation of multiple parties, but extensive political science research concludes that multi-party systems in nascent democracies can be de-stabilizing because they foster uncontrolled competition and deter interest aggregation. Fortunately, the *Post-Conflict* document communicates the need for training and development of political party skills, to include several of the key functions identified in this paper. Unfortunately, none of this “political” training is found in U.S. military doctrine. In order for whole-of-government approaches to work, U.S. military doctrine must take the same approach as counter-part civilian agencies such as the State Department and USAID.

#### *Strategic Level Recommendations.*

At the strategic and theater level, more resources should be dedicated to political development, not just public administration training. Senior U.S. government leaders charged with orchestrating stability and reconstruction activities, including theater and joint force commanders, need to understand the critical role that political development performs in S&R operations. Planning for political development should be overt, not implied within a line of effort. One recommendation would be to delineate between public administration and political development within governance lines of effort / lines of operation in campaign plans.

In addition, assessment systems at the combatant command and theater command should include independent provisions for assessing the state of political development (input institutions), not just public administration (output institutions). The characteristics of strong input institutions presented in this paper could be used as a foundation for such an assessment system. Strategic leaders and planners should avoid using the same assessment systems for input institutions that they use for output institutions. Though the political system needs both type of institutions, they have inherently different functions and logic. For example, efficiency is a quality desired in output institutions, but not in input institutions. Inclusion is a quality desired in input institutions, but inclusion is often in opposition to efficiency. The “Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)” tool from the Integrated Concept Analysis Framework (ICAF) of the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) could be modified to conduct this function.<sup>82</sup> In doing so, a well thought out assessment system can raise the awareness level of political development in a given stability operation.

Strategic leaders may not even need to significantly increase dedicated resources for political development efforts. In many fragile states, there are NGOs, CSOs and international organizations already operating that are conducting political development activities. The real challenge of strategic and operational leaders is gaining visibility of these organizations, understanding the unique characteristics of each, and finding ways to synergize their efforts with U.S. objectives when applicable. Input institutions built upon already existing organic organizations are the ideal candidates for empowerment and enhancement through purposeful development efforts.

### *Operational and Tactical Level Recommendations.*

At the operational and tactical level, implementing these concepts requires a different perspective. This paper does not argue that military service members set aside their core, professional skills to become political organizers (or possibly worse, politicians). This paper does argue, however, that in many ways, operational and tactical leaders are already doing some of the activities that help foster input institutions. Two such activities include **associative mechanisms** and **leadership by network**.

An **associative mechanism** is any social process that encourages disparate groups to work towards shared goals. These are the processes that facilitate the functions of input institutions (aggregating interests, organizing political participation, etc.). Associative mechanisms are the tactical means by which input institutions (whether political parties or federalist branches) conduct their operations (i.e. their functions). The concept of *social capital* from the field of sociology is an excellent example of a candidate to be an associative mechanism. *Social capital* “refers to social networks, norms of reciprocity, mutual assistance, and trustworthiness.”<sup>83</sup> At its most basic level, social capital is built through familiarity and the forming of relationships, a key component to understanding social behavior. People who interact frequently and in a constructive fashion quickly learn that working in big groups has many advantages over working in small groups. At first, the advantages are mostly material – ‘we can accomplish more working together’; later, such advantages move onto Maslow’s second level of needs (the need for belonging), and groups begin to gain value out of new associations in a social sense. When this happens, social capital is built.

There are two types of social capital—bonding capital and bridging capital.

Some networks link people who are similar in crucial respects and tend to be inward looking—bonding social capital. Others encompass different types of people and tend to be outward-looking—bridging social capital...Bonding social capital is a kind of sociological Super Glue, whereas bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40.<sup>84</sup>

Bonding social capital comes almost naturally to human groups and in traditional societies bonding social capital is everywhere. However, "...a society that has *only* bonding social capital will look like Belfast or Bosnia—segregated into mutually hostile camps."<sup>85</sup> Bonding social capital contributes to societal friction that resists modernization efforts. The challenge for fragile states and traditional societies is to build bridging capital, a necessary requirement for the formation of a national identity.

Social scientists conclude that bridging capital is formed when two disparate groups are joined together to work toward a common cause.<sup>86</sup> This is hardly a revolutionary concept; however, the emphasis of sociologists in such joint endeavors is not the accomplishment of the task at hand, but the relationships that are formed during the achievement of the task. By working together the two formerly divided groups learn to communicate, coordinate, and to trust one another. This builds social cohesion that will remain even after the task at hand is finished. In addition, through many studies of social capital formation, social scientists now believe that social capital is best built between small groups where individual interactions are possible. The literature on social capital formation almost

universally concludes that “social capital is necessarily a local phenomenon.”<sup>87</sup>

Tactical and operational leaders can leverage output institutions (programs run by the host-nation government) to build social bridging capital and input institutions. Afghanistan provides an excellent contemporary example. One of GIRoA’s programs is the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development’s (MRRD) National Solidarity Program (NSP) that helps build Community Development Councils (CDCs) at the municipal level. While the NSP’s focus is mostly on infrastructure construction (task-centric behavior), it would not be difficult for the MRRD to expand the NSP’s objectives to include the building of social bridging capital between municipalities by coalescing their efforts towards larger projects. The already existing National Area Based Development Program (NABDP) or the National Rural Access Programme (NRAP) that facilitate larger projects by coalescing the efforts of multiple CDCs could also serve as social bridging instruments.<sup>88</sup> The Independent Directorate of Local Governance’s (IDLG) Afghan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP) that provides services at the local level might also serve as another platform to build bridging capital.<sup>89</sup> These examples from Afghanistan show that the development of output institutions and input institutions may complement one another as long as they are undertaken with a deep understanding of existing social structures and organic institutions.

Another activity performed by many military forces in S&R operations is serving as human-network orchestrators in order to facilitate whole-of-government cooperation. In this function, many military units serve as the organizational equivalent to Malcolm

Gladwell's *connectors*, people who build wide networks of acquaintances so they can make opportunity linkages when needed.<sup>90</sup> In recent public administration theory, this style of leadership has been called *governance by network*.<sup>91</sup> In governance by network, leaders of government focus more on goal setting and decision-making and allow members of a public sector network to choose which goals they are going to support and what contributions they are going to make. An organization that governs by network fosters collaboration, cooperation, or perhaps simply communication amongst a wide array of organizations that deal with a policy arena, no matter how distantly they touch the arena. This style of governance focuses more on **building relationships** than on **actually getting things done**. The 'getting things done' happens at the initiative of those who have been connected in the network. Many military forces involved in S&R operations already conduct leadership by network. They help synchronize and synergize the efforts of not only U.S. government agencies, but NGOs, CSOs, and other international organizations toward shared goals. In this way, many military forces are already fostering social bridging capital and building the foundation for input institutions.

The recommendations this paper has made for improving the U.S. approach to political stability are modest, and there is ample precedent for many of them. Many of the recommended adjustments to military doctrine and strategic planning are already reflected to some degree in State Department and USAID policies. The task is to synergize DoD policies and U.S. military doctrine with counterpart USAID and DoS doctrine and policies. Recommended changes to strategic resourcing and focus can leverage existing programs and concepts in the broader U.S. govern-

ment. Finally, many of the operational and tactical activities required to advance political development and the forming of input institutions are already conducted to some degree, and precedents have already been set. As stated at the beginning of this paper, the major challenge to U.S. stability and reconstruction doctrine and strategy is intellectual in nature. We need to understand that political development is important—important enough to merit its own logical approach during stability operations—and that political stability without political development will remain elusive. By fostering political development through the creation of strong input institutions, the U.S. can avoid creating praetorian societies and help foster civic societies.

## ENDNOTES

1. The term “fragile states” is the doctrinal term used in *JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations* for all types of nation-states in distress, to include failed states, failing states, weak states and ungoverned spaces. The term *fragile states* will be used in this paper to refer to all states in these conditions.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-24: Counterinsurgency Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 5, 2009, p. x.

2. U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2010*, Suffolk, VA: U.S. JFCOM-J59, February 18, 2010, pp. 50-52.

3. Liana Sun Wyler, *Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy*, CRS Report to Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 28, 2008, pp. 6-7.

4. James A Schear, et al., “Chapter 5: Fragile States and Ungoverned Spaces,” in Patrick M. Cronin, ed., *Global Strategic Assessment, 2009: America’s Security Role in a Changing World*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009, p. 100.

5. Ibid., pp. 105-107.
6. Stewart Patrick: "The Brutal Truth," *The Failed States Index* 2011 by *Foreign Policy*, no. 187, Jul/Aug 2011, pp. 55-56.
7. President Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy, May 2010*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010, p. 8.
- U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2010, p. 9.
- ADM M.G. Mullen, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 2011, p. 4.
8. Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Stability Operations," Department of Defense Instruction 3000.5, Washington, DC, September 16, 2009.
9. Ibid., p. 21.
10. Gates, QDR, p. 20.
11. Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai, *Iraq After US Withdrawl: US Policy and the Iraqi Search for Security and Stability*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2012, pp. 37, 44, 45.
12. In the early Roman Empire, the Praetorian Guard was a force of bodyguards used by Roman Emperors. To be a member of the Praetorian Guard was very prestigious. They were specially recruited and were an elite force. They were disbanded by Emperor Constantine I in the fourth century AD. Dishonored and unemployed, they became mercenaries. They influenced politics through threats of force, assassinations and military coups. They assassinated many emperors (including Caligula in 41 AD), placed many later emperors on the throne under their direction, and heavily influenced Roman politics. The term "praetorian" came to be synonymous with conspiracy, disloyalty, and assassination.

13. Flouroy, DoDI 3000.5.
14. United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace, 2009, pp. 3-12 thru 3-18, 8-98 thru 8-129.
15. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Fragile States Strategy, January 2005*, Washington, DC: USAID, Jan 2005, pp. 7-8.
16. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks," United States Department of State, Washington, DC, April 2005.
17. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-07: Stability Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 Sep 2011, pp. III-50 – III-51.
18. U.S. Department of the Army, *FM 3-07: Stability Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, Oct 2008, pp. 3-13 – 3-14.
19. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 Mar 2013, p. 123.
20. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* (New York, NY: Penguin Books USA Inc., 1993), 24.

They compare governance to steering a boat versus rowing it. Steering the boat – determining its future course and navigating through the river – is government's most central function. The rowing of the boat – the providing of services to citizens, such as security, law & order, and regulation – can be done by governments but is not the core function. These other functions can be provided by other sectors – the private sector, the third party sector – in accordance with the most efficient sector to perform the function.

21. David Marsh, and Gerry Stoker, eds., *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 7-8.
22. James E. Anderson, *Public Policymaking*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000, pp. 2-7.
23. H. George Frederickson, *The Spirit of Public Administration*, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997, pp. 3-4.
24. DoDI 3000.5.
25. Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*, New York:NY, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011, p. 458.
26. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 6.
27. Christopher T. Fisher, "The Illusion of Progress: CORDS and the Crisis of Modernization in South Vietnam, 1965-1968," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 75, No. 1, 2006, pp. 25-26.
28. Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order*, p. 459.  
Huntington, pp. 1-8.
29. Ibid., p. 41.
30. Fukuyama's book argues that politically stable nation-states feature three well developed institutions: the state (or government), the rule of law, and accountability mechanisms. His work reviews multiple historical case studies of how these three institutions come into existence in various nation-states.

Daron Acemoglu and James R. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, New York:NY, Brown Business, 2012, pp. 79-83.

Acemoglu and Robinson's book argues that prosperous nations feature inclusive economic institutions, institutions that involve the broadest number of people to maximize wealth generation and distribution. They contrast these against nations that

have extractive economic institutions where elites extract wealth from the rest of society. They also argue that inclusive economic institutions are only possible in nations that have inclusive political institutions that are pluralistic in participation, versus exclusive political institutions where participation is limited to elites.

31. Huntington, p. 346.

“In theory two broad strategies are open to the reformer who desires to bring about a number of significant changes in social-economic structure and political institutions. One strategy would lead him to make known all his goals at an early time and to press for as many of them as he could in the hope of obtaining as much as possible. The alternative strategy is the foot-in-the-door approach of concealing his aims, separating the reforms from each other, and pushing for only one change at a time. The former is a comprehensive, ‘root,’ or *blitzkrieg* approach; the latter is an incremental, ‘branch,’ or Fabian approach... To achieve his goals the reformer should separate and isolate one issue from another, but, having done this, he should when the time is ripe, dispose of each issue as rapidly as possible, removing it from the political agenda before his opponents are able to mobilize their forces.”

32. (UNCLASSIFIED) LTC Michael McGee, “SUBJ: Is the Coalition Corrupting Afghanistan?” NKAIA, Kabul, Afghanistan: IJC DSRT, 26 Sep 2010, p. 5.

33. Huntington, pp. 49-50.

34. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

35. LTC Bruce Ferrell, “An Alternative Approach to Developing Governance in GIRoA: Focusing on Institutional Capacity,” NKAIA, Kabul, Afghanistan: IJC DSRT, 31 Oct 2010, p. 18.

36. Huntington, p. 8.

37. Ibid., p. 33.

38. Ibid., p. 30.

39. Ibid., p. 31.

40. Ibid., p. 53.

41. Scholars have suggested multiple reasons why military forces engaged in S&R operations, and some civilian organizations, favor the development of output institutions. One suggested reason is that since output institutions conduct primarily the tasks of public administration, which is closely related to the field of management, military leaders and planners are more comfortable identifying the needs required for public administration. Another potential reason is that *output* functions are more easily quantified than *input* functions, and therefore lend themselves more easily to assessment systems.

42. S = Sewer, W = Water, E = Electricity, A = Academics/ schools, T = Trash service, M = Medical, and S = Safety.

JP 3-07, p. III-52.

43. Huntington, p. 192.

44. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 35.

In *The Accidental Guerilla*, David Kilcullen's fundamental argument is that when external nations intervene in other nations under the guise of combating terrorism, they invoke a response similar to when a virus enters a human body. The human body mobilizes anti-bodies to combat the virus. Kilcullen argues that many guerillas currently fighting Western interventionist militaries are the equivalent of "societal antibodies;" they are mobilized only by the presence of the Western interventionist. The argument implies that had the Western power not entered the society in the first place, these "accidental guerillas" would never have been mobilized.

45. Principal-agent relationships are a higher evolved form of dyadic relationships than patron-client relationships. Patron-client relationships tend to describe relationships that are more temporary and transactional in nature. Principal-agent relationships tend to be more normalized through formal arrangements, such as hierarchies, contracts, or formal networks.

Abdulkader H. Sinno, *Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010, p. 11.

46. Ibid.

47. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 6, Nov/Dec, 1997, pp. 25-26.

48. Ibid., p. 22.

49. Ibid., p. 23.

50. Ibid., p. 24.

51. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1971, p. 2.

52. This definition is from the author of this monograph. Dahl's exact model for defining and measuring public contestation is beyond the scope of this monograph.

53. Dahl, pp. 6-10.

54. Huntington, p. 5.

55. Ibid., pp. 91-92.

56. Dahl, pp. 5-7.

57. Ashley Elliot, "Political Party Development in Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities," *Policy Options for State-Building in Afghanistan*, SAIS Spring 2009, April 18, 2009, p. 3, available from [www.areu.org](http://www.areu.org), accessed on 15 Oct 2010.

58. Huntington, p. 34.

59. Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan*, New York, NY: Seven Treasures Publications, 2009 [originally published in 1651].

60. Huntington, p. 196.

61. Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 8.

62. Huntington, p. 143.

63. Ibid., p. 74.

64. Ibid., p. 71.

65. Ibid., p. 12.

66. Ibid., pp. 13-16.

67. Ibid., p. 18.

68. Ibid., p. 19.

69. Ibid., p. 20.

70. Ibid., p. 21.

71. Ibid., pp. 22-23

72. Marsh and Stoker, p. 61.

73. Huntington, pp. 78-79.

74. Ibid., p. 196.

75. Carolyn Stephenson, "Nation Building," *Beyond Intractability*, Jan 2005, p. 4.

76. Dahl argues that three conditions are necessary for competitiveness: (1) the ability of citizens to formulate preferences; (2) the ability of citizens to signify preferences by individual and collective action; and (3) to have their preferences weighed equally. For these conditions to exist, Dahl proposed eight guarantees that would be provided by institutions: freedom to form organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, citizen eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support/votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair

elections, and institutions to make policy depend on support/votes. Since the operational definition of political institutions in this monograph is “stable, recurring patterns of behavior,” these guarantees are thus insured by institutionalization.

77. Huntington, p. 78.

78. “Afghan Civics Guide,” available from “IJC Information Dominance Center Afghan-Wiki”, IJC Intranet, accessed 25 March 2010.

79. Huntington, p. 197.

80. Ibid., p. 264.

81. Thania Paffenholz, “Summary of Results for a Comparative Research Project: Civil Society and Peacebuilding,” *The Centre for Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding*, Geneva, Switzerland: CCDP, 2009, p. 13.

82. Michael Dziedzic, Barbara Sotirin, John Agoglia, “Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE),” U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC: USIP, 2008.

83. Robert D. Putnam and Lewis M. Feldstein, *Better Together: Restoring the American Community*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2003, p. 3.

84. Putnam & Lewis, p. 2.

85. Ibid., p. 3.

86. Ibid., p. 10.

87. Ibid., p. 9.

88. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), “Unity of Effort: Why Partnering with the MRRD is the best way for ISAF to Bring Peace and Stability to Afghanistan,” Presentation at the COIN Academy (Camp Julien, Afghanistan, 3 March 2010), slides 5-22.

89. Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), "What is Governance, Local Structure in Afghanistan? And What is IDLG?" Presentation at the COIN Academy, Camp Julien, Afghanistan, 3 March 2010, slides 6-11.

90. Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference*, New York, NY: Little Brown and Company, 2000, p. 38.

91. Stephen Goldsmith and William D. Eggers, *Governing by Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector*, New York, NY: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

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
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